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Statelessness and the Lives of the Children of Migrants in Sabah, East Malaysia 
Catherine Allerton∗ 
 
 
Abstract:  
This article explores issues involved with researching statelessness ‘on the ground’ during ethnographic 
fieldwork in Malaysia with the children of migrants and refugees. It argues that many of these children, whose 
parents or grandparents originate from Indonesia or the Philippines, lack an ‘effective nationality’. However, 
rather than statelessness or illegality per se, what dominates these children’s lives is their perpetual 
‘foreignness’. Even when children might be able to have their citizenship recognised by a parental country of 
origin, families often prefer to remain undocumented, and to wait (perhaps indefinitely) for the Malaysian 
citizenship they perceive as rightfully theirs. 
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The primary injustice the stateless experience (…) is not that they cannot 
find a state to grant them citizenship but that the state which should grant 
them citizenship will, for various reasons, not do so.1 
 
In printed and web-based material, stateless children are commonly symbolised by the image 
of a young, wide-eyed child, looking forlornly into the distance. Such images are often, 
though not always, accompanied by text suggesting that stateless children are ‘lost,’ ‘lacking 
an identity’ or ‘a place in the world’.  An example of this kind of approach would be by 
many of the photographs of Greg Constantine, a photojournalist who has done much to 
highlight the issue of statelessness in Asia. Constantine’s photographs of ‘The Lost Children 
of Sabah’ – one of several cases in his ‘Nowhere People’ project – focus predominantly on 
children working in a fish market and usually portray an image of forlorn hopelessness.2 
 
Such images are in strong contrast to my own experiences acquired through researching the 
lives of children at risk of statelessness in Sabah, East Malaysia. These are moving images of 
children performing choreographed dances to music emerging from mobile phones, or 
jumping high over elastic in the yard of a learning centre. From August 2012 to August 
2013, I carried out ethnographic fieldwork in the city of Kota Kinabalu with the children of 
Indonesian and Filipino migrants. Ethnography, the primary methodological tool of 
anthropologists, aims at uncovering, through the sharing of daily experiences, people’s                                                         
∗  
1 Matthew J Gibney, ‘Statelessness and the Right to Citizenship’ (2009) 32 Forced Migration Review 50, 50. 
2 See Greg Constantine, ‘Nowhere people project. 
’<http://www.nowherepeople.org/index.php#s=0&mi=2&pt=1&pi=10000&p=4&a=0&at=0> accessed 20 October 2013. 
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taken-for-granted and everyday understandings. Thus, in addition to researching the 
conditions in which these children lived, and the problems that they faced, I wanted to 
uncover children’s own perspectives on their past, present and future. Though I knew 
children who lived in difficult circumstances, who had faced past adversity or a highly 
uncertain future, it would be hard to describe any of these children as ‘lost’ or as ‘nowhere 
people’. Indeed, one of my strongest memories from fieldwork is of an eleven year-old boy 
who, in response to my question about his ethnic origins, looked fiercely at me and 
exclaimed, ‘I am a person from here!’ 
 
This paper, written just a few weeks after ending fieldwork and leaving Malaysia, represents 
an early reflection on some of the issues encountered in researching statelessness ‘on the 
ground’. It aims not only to explore the difference between ‘legal’ and ‘effective’ 
statelessness, but also to highlight people’s desires for the nationality of their choice. 
Statelessness, as an international issue of concern, tends to be approached primarily in terms 
of law and policy. As such, it might be assumed that the primary obstacle the stateless wish 
to overcome (in whatever way possible) is their statelessness. However, in order to write an 
ethnographic account of statelessness, we need to consider the ways in which, in real 
people’s lives, ‘statelessness’ might merge with wider issues of (il)legality and belonging.  
Moreover, as I shall argue, we need to take seriously people’s sense of exclusion from the 
nationality to which they feel they belong.  
 
1. Children of Migrants in Sabah 
 
In Malaysia, there are four main groups of people who are described as either stateless or at 
risk of statelessness: Rohingya refugees from Burma, Malaysians of Indian descent, 
members of the traditionally nomadic, boat-dwelling Bajau Laut/ Sama Dilaut community, 
and the children of refugees and migrants in Sabah, north Borneo. A glance at many 
advocacy publications on statelessness shows that children of migrants in Sabah are 
frequently mentioned as an example of a stateless population.3 However, determining the 
precise legal status of many of these children is in fact extremely complicated, as I myself 
am only just beginning to discover. 
 
                                                        
3 Plan and UNHCR, Under the Radar and Under Protected: The Urgent Need to Address Stateless Children’s Rights 
(2012) 10. 
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The state known today as Sabah has long been connected to the wider Southeast Asian and 
South China Sea region through trade and migration routes.4 However, the migrations that 
are most relevant to the legal status of the children I know began in the early 1970s and 
continued through the 1980s, when Muslim refugees from the civil war in the Southern 
Philippines arrived in Sabah.5 At the same time, the numbers of Indonesian workers moving 
to Sabah to work in the timber industry and on oil palm plantations began to steadily 
increase.  Since then, as Sabah’s economy has become increasingly reliant on migrant 
labour, and as family members have come to the state to join earlier migrants, the numbers 
of ‘foreigners’ in the state have rapidly grown. In the last census (2010), non-Malaysian 
citizens accounted for 27.81% of Sabah’s total population of 3.2 million people.6 However, 
the actual number of ‘foreigners’ is likely to be even higher, since the census figures do not 
include undocumented migrants.7 
 
Today, foreign workers continue to be found in timber mills and on plantations, as well as in 
construction, agriculture, transport and service industries, including informal domestic 
service. Yet, despite this economic reliance on migrants, there is considerable public and 
political opposition to their presence, and the authorities have initiated various ‘crackdowns’, 
rounding up and deporting thousands of undocumented workers. Malaysian immigration 
policy treats migrant labour as ‘fluid’ and unattached. Unskilled and semi-skilled workers 
(with the exception of domestic workers) are only allowed to stay in Malaysia for five years, 
after which they should return home and stay for six months before re-entering Malaysia.8 
Such workers are not allowed to bring their families with them to Malaysia, or to marry or 
have children whilst in Malaysia.9 Indeed, there is a very real sense in which the children of 
migrants are considered ‘illegal’ simply because of being born to foreign workers. This may 
be one reason why their exclusion from government schools – noted as a serious problem by 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to education – does not attract much local 
opposition.10                                                         
4 See Bilson Kurus, ‘Migrant Labor: The Sabah Experience’ (1998) 7 Asian and Pacific Migration 200, 281-295; Koji 
Miyazaki (ed), Making of multi-cultural Sabah (Tokyo, Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa 
2002). 
5 Azizah Kassim, ‘Filipino Refugees in Sabah: State Responses, Public Stereotypes and the Dilemma over their Future’ 
(2009) 47 Southeast Asian Studies 58. 
6 Department of Statistics Malaysia, ‘Population Statistics Malysia’ (2010)  
<http://www.statistics.gov.my/portal/download_Population/files/population/05Jadual_Mukim_negeri/Mukim_Sabah.pdf> 
accessed 18 October 2013. 
7 Azizah Kassim, ‘Cross-Border Movement of Foreign Workers in Malaysia: A Comparative Analysis’ (2005) 3 Master 
Builders Journal 78, 82. 
8 Ibid 79. 
9 Amnesty International, Trapped: The Exploitation of Migrant Workers in Malaysia (2010, ASA 28/02/2010) 15. 
10 UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Vernor Muñoz Villalobos: addendum: mission to 
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In reality, and despite such immigration policies, migrant workers have multiple ties and 
attachments to Sabah, and as people have married and had children, the legal status of their 
families has become very complicated. Families face problems in applying for and renewing 
documents, and have their desire for legality exploited by unscrupulous agents, police and 
others. For a variety of reasons, many of the children of migrants do not have their births 
registered. These reasons range from lack of knowledge about the registration process, 
avoidance of hospital birth due to the high cost for foreigners, the irregular migration status 
of parents (and concomitant fear of being reported to immigration), and parents lack of a 
marriage certificate.11 
 
The families that I know in Sabah span the full range of possibilities of documentation: from 
families where parents and children are all fully documented and ‘legal’ to those where no 
family members have any valid legal documents. However, the majority are somewhere 
between these two extremes, including many families where members have wildly varying 
legal statuses. For example, one family consisted of: a father who possessed a ‘Permanent 
Resident’ identity card, a mother with an expired IMM13 (a document, renewed annually, 
allowing refugees and their families the right to remain in Malaysia), a grandmother with no 
documents, an older sister with full Malaysian citizenship thanks to her (paid) ‘adoption’, a 
brother with an IMM13, and three younger siblings with no documents. But do difficulties in 
accessing and renewing documents, when combined with the length of time that parents and 
grandparents have been absent from their home countries, mean that these children are either 
legally or effectively stateless? 
 
2. ‘Statelessness’ on the Ground in Sabah 
 
 According to the currently accepted definition of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), outlined in the ‘Prato Conclusions’, an individual is considered 
legally stateless if all states to which he or she has a ‘relevant’ or ‘factual’ link fail to 
consider the person as a national.12 In Sabah, children thought to be at risk of statelessness 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Malaysia (20 March 2009) UN Doc. A/HRC/11/8/Add.2,14. 
11 Tenaganita, Acting Today for Tomorrow’s Generation: Regional Conference on Stateless/ Undocumented Children in 
Sabah (16-18 November 2005, Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia) 31-43. 
12 UNHCR, ‘Expert Meeting: The Concept of Statelessness under International Law, Summary Conclusions’. (2010, Prato, 
Italy). See also Open Society Justice Initiative, ‘De Jure Statelessness in the Real World: Applying the Prato Summary 
Conclusions’ (Open Society Institute 2011) 4. 
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have factual links with Malaysia (as their country of residence and - in the vast majority of 
cases - of birth) and with at least one other country (usually Indonesia or the Philippines, 
from where their parents or grandparents originated). Therefore, in the case of children born 
in Sabah but considered ‘foreign’ by the Malaysian authorities, the key question is whether 
or not they would be considered nationals by Indonesia or the Philippines. In the case of 
children of Indonesian parents, this issue is fairly straightforward. Although many children 
of Indonesian migrants born in Sabah lack documents, there is an Indonesian consulate in 
Kota Kinabalu which regularly issues birth certificates and passports for the children of its 
nationals. For children of Indonesians living in the interior of Sabah, the expense of 
travelling to the city may prohibit the acquisition of such documents, making recognition of 
Indonesian citizenship theoretically possible, but practically difficult to achieve. 
Nevertheless, children of Indonesians are fairly unlikely to fall into the category of de jure 
stateless children. 
 
The situation for the children and grandchildren of Filipino nationals is much more complex. 
The Philippines does not have a consulate in Sabah (on the island of Borneo) but in Kuala 
Lumpur (in peninsular Malaysia). This is largely because of ongoing political sensitivities 
surrounding the Philippines’ historical claim to Sabah as a former part of the ‘Sultanate of 
Sulu’. 13  This ‘claim’ is hotly disputed by ‘native’ Sabahans, and its political fallout 
contributes to anti-Filipino sentiment in the state.14 Moreover, it is practically difficult for 
Filipinos in Sabah to obtain documents, given both the expense of travelling, and the fact 
that holders of IMM13 ‘refugee’ cards are unable to leave Sabah. The majority of those who 
might use the services of mobile registration units (which occasionally visit Sabah) do not 
know of their existence. Thus, whilst the government of the Philippines is known to be 
‘generous’ in granting citizenship to even the undocumented children or grandchildren of 
refugees and migrants who claim it, in practice most are unable to make such a claim. 
Though the extent to which this renders the descendants of Filipinos vulnerable to 
statelessness may be debatable, such people clearly lack what has been termed an ‘effective 
nationality’.15                                                          
13 On the Sultanate of Sulu see James F. Warren, The Sulu Zone, 1768-1898: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery and 
Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State (Singapore University Press, 1981). 
14 In 2013, such sentiments were enflamed when an armed group, claiming to represent the modern-day Sultan of Sulu, 
entered Sabah from the Philippines. The ‘Lahad Datu standoff’ ended in violence and has led to the creation of a special 
security zone in eastern Sabah. See Associated Press, ‘Malaysia launches air strikes against squatter sultan's Filipino 
army’The Guardian (Kuala Lumpur, 5 March 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/05/malaysia-bombs-
borneo-expel-sultan> accessed 21 October 2013. 
15 Brad Blitz, ‘Advocacy Campaigns and Policy Development’ (2009) 32 Forced Migration Review 25, 25-26. 
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During my fieldwork with children and their families over the past year, my attention has 
also been drawn to the emotional realities that complicate discussions of citizenship or 
belonging on the ground. Take 10 year-old Aisyah, a Suluk girl holding an IMM13 card, 
whose grandparents came to Sabah as refugees in the 1970s. Once, during a discussion with 
her class about the differences between Sabah and the Philippines, Aisyah told me: ‘I don’t 
know anything about the Philippines’. She has no family that she knows of left there, has 
never been there, and explicitly refuses to discuss it as a place with which she should have 
any connection. As holders of IMM13 cards, Aisyah and her parents are ‘legal’, in the sense 
of being allowed to remain in Sabah. However, they still lack a nationality. Whether or not 
the government of the Philippines would recognise them as citizens, and notwithstanding the 
inability of Aisyah and her brothers to attend Malaysian government school, the important 
point in their case is that they do not want to be Filipino citizens, since they feel they belong 
in Malaysia. Thus, when the Filipino learning centre, where Aisyah studied, organised 
document-processing by the Philippines National Statistics Office, neither Aisyah nor her 
brothers were interested in applying for such documents. This implies that for some people, 
the impulse to escape statelessness is by no means as strong as the impulse to ‘hold out’ for a 
particular, preferred nationality that might be gained in the future.  
 
Studying statelessness on the ground in Sabah is complicated, not only by such cases of 
long-term residence by people lacking either an effective nationality, or by their possible 
preference for temporary stateless over Filipino nationality, in order that they might 
eventually gain the Malaysian nationality they feel they deserve. It is also complicated by the 
reality that many refugees from the Philippines originally came to Sabah to escape fighting, 
in which they were as likely to have been killed by their national army as by Muslim 
separatists. It is ironic that many Suluk people, who express ambivalence towards what they 
see as the ‘colonial’ Philippines state in Muslim-majority areas of that country, are simply 
treated as ‘Filipinos’ by Malaysians in Sabah. Some of the children of such ‘Filipinos’ had 
heard stories of violence and warfare from their parents and grandparents, and repeated to 
me the opinion that, whatever difficulties were experienced in Malaysia, it was at least safer 
than the place from which their family originated. Recent reports of fighting in and around 
Zamboanga city, in the south of the island of Mindanao,16 illustrate the reality of such safety 
concerns for those who lack desire to ‘return’ to the Philippines. Moreover, ongoing violence                                                         
16 BBC, ‘Rebels and troops resume fight in southern Philippines’ BBC (14 September 2013)  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24089553> accessed 14 September 2013. 
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in the southern Philippines, from which many people continue to flee, complicates any easy 
separation of earlier ‘refugees’ from contemporary ‘economic migrants’.  
 
On the ground, statelessness as a distinctive issue often disappears from view, since it is 
almost completely entangled with wider issues of ‘illegality’. Even if one were clearly able 
to separate ‘stateless children’ from ‘undocumented children’, their practical experience is in 
fact very similar. This is why, despite their differing ethnicities and family histories, and 
despite the different degrees of assistance offered by their apparent ‘home’ countries, the 
children of Indonesians and Filipinos actually share many common experiences. Children 
who lack legal documents fear being picked up by the police during one of the regular 
operations – on buses, in shopping centres or in squatter settlements – aimed at ‘checking’ 
documents. This is particularly the case for children aged over 12, the age at which young 
Malaysian citizens are supposed to acquire an identity card. Whatever the complexity of 
legally establishing an individual as ‘stateless’, in Sabah (as has been argued for other 
contexts 17 ) legal statelessness must be analysed alongside the kind of ‘effective 
statelessness’ created by irregular migration. Indeed, given that holders of IMM13 passes are 
potentially stateless but nevertheless legally documented, it remains to be explored whether, 
in this specific context, there might be some advantages to being ‘stateless’ over being 
‘undocumented’.  
 
3. Can there be an Ethnography of Statelessness? 
 
The entanglement of statelessness with wider issues of illegality in Sabah makes its 
ethnographic exploration somewhat tricky. During my fieldwork with the children of 
migrants, I was able to observe and explore children’s experiences of and perspectives on 
many issues, including friendship, documents, the police, schooling, work, families and 
dancing. I observed the limitations that illegality placed on children’s lives, and their 
occasionally defiant responses. I laughed as children, so different to those conventional 
images of forlorn statelessness, made constant jokes about ethnicity, about police 
checkpoints and about corruption. I also saw a frustration amongst some teenagers as they 
became aware that, in their perpetual status as ‘foreigners’, they are also doomed to do the 
jobs (cleaning, construction, factory-work) that ‘foreigners’ do. However, ‘statelessness’ as 
such was not something that I could explore ethnographically, given both the uncertainties                                                         
17  Jacqueline Bhabha, ‘From Citizen to Migrant: The Scope of Child Statelessness in the Twenty-First Century’ in 
Jacqueline Bhabha (ed) Children without a State: A Global Human Rights Challenge (The MIT Press 2011). 
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surrounding people’s legal status, and young people’s own lack of awareness of this legal 
concept. 
 
What children and young people are aware of is the power of documents in their lives. They 
are also profoundly aware of their own lack of power in the face of ever-changing 
regulations, corruption and, in some rare cases such as a boy whose father sold his birth 
certificate on the black market, unreliable family protection. When I asked children why they 
thought children such as themselves – children considered ‘foreign’ and treated as unwanted 
by the wider society until old enough to take up the kinds of menial labour performed by 
‘foreigners’ – could not attend government schools, their answers were revealing. The most 
common answers were ‘because foreign children don’t have birth certificates’ and ‘because 
foreign children don’t have proper documents.’ For these children, it is their lack of 
documents that prevents them from receiving Malaysian education. However, the reality is 
that even children with ‘proper’ documents are unable to attend government schools if those 
documents state that they are ‘non-citizens’. Unlike other contexts, it is not statelessness or 
illegality per se that prevent children from accessing education (or health care) in Malaysia. 
Rather, it is their perpetual ‘foreignness’, their exclusion from Malaysian citizenship. 
 
In this paper I have given a very preliminary account of the difficulties of determining the 
‘statelessness’ of the children of migrants in Sabah, and the entanglement of this issue with 
other issues on the ground. However, I have also tried to show how, in this context, people 
do not necessarily desire the nationality that might be most easily available to them. One 
young woman I knew well had a Filipino father and an Indonesian mother, parents who – 
like many such couples – had met as migrant labourers in Sabah. She once confessed that 
she had never tried to gain either Filipino or Indonesian identity documents. Rather, for as 
long as she is unable to gain a Malaysian identity card, (and whatever her legal position 
might in fact be) she considers herself to be ‘stateless’. She may be very unusual amongst 
those I knew in explicitly referring to statelessness rather than ‘documents’, but her sense 
that her ‘rightful’ identity is Malaysian, is common. Her and the other children and young 
people I knew do not consider themselves ‘nowhere people’. This is why, in considering 
statelessness, we must not neglect broader issues of justice and human rights, or the fact that 
children of migrants may not simply desire ‘documents’, but recognition of their right to be 
considered ‘people from here’. 
 
